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NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LEGAL
STATUS OF MIGRANT WORKERS:
DISPATCHES FROM THE
ARABIAN GULF
DAVID MEDNICOFF*
INTRODUCTION
In many societies, including the United States, non-citizen mi
grants1 are increasingly seen as a problem of national security.2
This perception is in line with the nature and diversity of migration
in an era of globalization, which brings waves of people from one
country or area to others. It also comports with the idea that secur
ity increasingly encompasses subjective and politically-constructed
issues that fit into the category of existential or identity threats. A
government’s consideration of an issue as a security challenge has
implications; the issue receives privileges in terms of national atten
tion and economic resources.3 Thus, securitizing a policy problem
is the surest way of prioritizing it.
* A.B., Princeton, A.M., J.D., Ph.D., Harvard, Assistant Professor of Public Pol
icy and Associate Director, Social Thought and Political Economy Program, University
of Massachusetts – Amherst. The author wishes to thank the editors for their help, as
well as Vanessa Megaw for her extensive research assistance.
1. The issue of non-citizen workers is so charged that the very term for the people
in question lacks standardization. Because Arab Gulf governments formally reject the
idea that workers from other countries can gain citizenship or other permanent-resident
status, the term “migrant” or “muhajir” tends not to be used. Rainer Bauböck, How
Immigration Transforms Citizenship: International, Multinational and Transnational
¨
Perspectives 11 (Osterreichische
Akademie der Wissenschaften Forschungsstelle fur
¨ institutionellen Wandel und europäische Integration, Working Paper No. 24, 2002) http://
www.eif.oeaw.ac.at/downloads/workingpapers/IWE-Papers/WP24.pdf (on the Gulf
state’s strategy of formally rejecting citizenship of migrant workers). I have therefore
deployed a mixture of terms, “non-citizen,” “migrant,” “guest worker,” and “non-na
tional,” reflecting the contested nature of the subject.
2. See Myron Weiner, Security, Stability and International Migration, 17 INT’L
SEC. 91, 91-126 (1992) (providing an early example of some key analytical issues that
are affected by this shift to view non-citizen migrants as a security problem).
3. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & MAGALY SANCHEZ R., BROKERED BOUNDARIES:
CREATING IMMIGRANT IDENTITY IN ANTI-IMMIGRANT TIMES 77 (2010) (stating that by
2008 the number of hours that United States enforcement have spent on “line-watch
hours stood at nearly eight times the 1986 level, the number of Border Patrol agents
121
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The national securitization of migration policy connects to a
core notion of the nature of a national security threat, yet also de
parts from it.4 The previous century of dramatic and destructive
wars among nations helped define national security issues as na
tional survival in terms of actual or perceived military threats from
other countries and defense systems.5 However, in the new millen
nium, interstate wars have given way to a more diverse array of
sources of global instability, which include civil conflict, the use of
force by non-state actors, and the increased absolute numbers of
migrants and residents of multiple states.6
My concern in this Article is with some of the implications of
the fact that national security issues are increasingly more likely to
be framed in terms of migration and movement of people than in
terms of missiles and military capacity. One important general im
plication is that national security policy is shifting to include a wide
range of national and state legislators and law enforcement agents
along with military officials.7 Thus, national security is defined and
regulated in the legal arena. In fact, the popular salience and visi
bility of migrants and issues surrounding them means that migra
tion is a national security question peculiarly prone to democratic
or populist contestation, the very opposite of the arcane, secret im
age of more traditional interstate military security issues.8
Yet, much of the thrust of this legalization and democratization
of security policy is the restriction of legal migrants and migrants’
had increased by a factor of 4.7, and the Border Patrol’s budget was twenty times its
1986 level”).
4. See Stephen M. Walt, The Renaissance of Security Studies, 35 INT’L STUD. Q.
211, 212 (1991) (defining the study of security within international relations theory as
“the study of the threat, use and control of military force”).
5. See, e.g., id. at 211-39.
6. See The US National Intelligence Council on Growing Global Migration, 27
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 817, 817-19 (report on implications of global migration),
available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695203; see also, ROGER OWEN, STATE,
POWER AND POLITICS IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 166-92, 200-13
(1992) (discussing non-state actors’ roles in the Middle East).
7. See BARRY BUZAN ET AL., SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
33-35 (1998) (examining the expansion of actors included in the discussion of securitiza
tion); David Cole, The Missing Patriot Debate, THE NATION, May 30, 2005, at 18-21
(discussing the 2001 Patriot Act and immigration).
8. Compare Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html
(reporting on Arizona’s 2010 immigration law, providing a recent example of migration
on the ballot), with DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND
LOVE THE BOMB (Columbia Pictures 1964) (providing an example, in this classic film
directed by Stanley Kubric, of how the image of a secretive American military is well
established within pop-culture).
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legal rights. Opening up the legal and policy contestation of na
tional security by shifting this rubric into the regulation of non-na
tionals has therefore meant, at least in part, governmental embrace
of laws and law enforcement that are costly, may not correspond to
the country’s actual labor needs, and may fan the flames of internal
national identity conflict.9 Of course, securitizing migrant labor
policy also harms the rights and livelihood of guest workers.10
Because of the above, the securitization of migration policy is
not regarded favorably by many legal and other commentators.11
Yet, it may be unrealistic to expect a fundamental reframing of na
tional migration policies away from the security sphere, given that
who is a stakeholder in a country remains fundamental as an aspect
of national identity and integrity. At the same time, it may be pos
sible to imagine a country that securitizes migration policy, but not
necessarily or consistently in a way that restricts the inflow of
migrants.
In fact, one need not imagine such a country, as this descrip
tion fits in contemporary nations of the Arabian Gulf—some of the
most dynamic and expansive, but also unusual, states in the world
today. The governments of nations like Kuwait, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates are variations on a theme of non-democratic
monarchical regimes. And, these regimes are hardly models of
human rights observance with respect to migrant workers.12 Yet
they have managed unusual decades of rapid growth and increasing
prominence, capped by Qatar’s selection as the site of the 2022
World Cup, while avoiding so far the wave of political discontent

9. See Wayne A. Cornelius & Takeyuki Tsuda, Controlling Immigration: The
Limits of Government Intervention, in CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PER
SPECTIVE 3, 9-11 (Wayne A. Cornelius et. al., eds., 2d ed. 2004) (discussing the conflict
between countries’ labor needs and policy).
10. See id.
11. See id. (discussing mounting evidence that securitization of migration policy is
not an effective or desirable method of limiting illegal immigration).
12. See, e.g., Maids in the Middle East: Little Better than Slavery, THE ECON.,
Sept. 4, 2010, at 51 (providing a specific example of human rights abuses related to
migrant workers in the Middle East); Middle East: End ‘Sponsored’ Gateway to Human
Trafficking, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 14, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/06/
14/middle-east-end-sponsored-gateway-human-trafficking (listing Kuwait, Saudi Ara
bia, and Qatar in its two lowest possible categories for efforts to combat human traffick
ing and identifying evidence that migrant workers in the United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Jordan withholding passports and wages while en
forcing long hours without adequate rest).
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that swept the Arab world early in 2011.13 Could it be nonetheless
that studying particular aspects of the interplay of national security,
migrants and national identity in countries like Qatar can shed light
on these issues in the more familiar context of the United States?
My analysis below suggests that this is indeed the case. The
handling of migrant workers in oil-rich, rapidly globalizing coun
tries like Qatar and its Arab Gulf neighbors is highly problematic,
and oftentimes exploitative or xenophobic.14 At the same time, the
problems faced by migrants to the Gulf and the United States are
different. Despite Gulf societies’ lack of interest in allowing for cit
izenship for guest workers, the predictability of contract and status
issues for these workers, and the overall likelihood of ongoing need
for high numbers of them represent important touchstones of cer
tainty for migrants.15
Predictability is much less prevalent in the American context
of fluctuating politics and low legal limits for non-citizen workers.
Thus, despite the United States’ promise of equal rights and poten
tial citizenship for migrants, which are both noticeably absent from
the political landscape of the Gulf, the American reality of unfore
seeable spurts of intense enforcement, detention, deportation, and
reductions in legal quotas for workers make for a difficult dynamic
for contemporary migrants.16 In both cases, turning migration pol
icy into a highly-charged issue of national security is the cause of
widespread difficulties. At the same time, determining which set of
difficulties is more problematic is highly subjective.
I proceed with this analysis in three stages. Part I introduces
Qatar as an exemplar Gulf Arab state, along with its current pres
sures around legal reform and non-citizen workers. Part II contex
13. FIFA World Cup 2022 and its Impact on the Qatar Economy, BARRBIZ, Vol.
2 Issue 2, Mar. 2011, available at http://www.barrconsultancy.com/pdf/barbiz-qatar-ex
pect-amazing-fifa-worldcup-2022-vol-2-issue-2.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Ray Jureidini, Migrant Workers and Xenophobia in the Middle East,
UNITED NATIONS RES. INST. FOR SOC. DEV. (Dec. 31, 2003), http://www.unrisd.org/
unrisd/website/document.nsf/0/045B62F1548C9C15C1256E970031D80D?Open
Document.
15. Despite the problems related to workers rights, a clearer set of rules does
improve the overall reputation of Qatar to migrant workers. According to a Himalayan
newspaper, Qatar is the second most desirable country for Nepalese people to work in.
Himalayan News Service, HRW Slams Kuwait for Exploitation of Migrant Workers,
THE HIMALAYAN TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.thehimalayantimes.com/printNepali
News.php?id=261004.
16. See Rob Paral, No Way In: U.S. Immigration Policy Leaves Few Legal Op
tions for Mexican Workers, IMMIGR. POL’Y IN FOCUS, July 2005, at 5 (discussing the
difficulties faced by those wishing to immigrate legally into the U.S.).
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tualizes the issue of the rule of law and identity in contemporary
Arab politics generally. In Part III, I discuss the law and politics of
citizen regulation as a security issue in Qatar and the Gulf. In Part
IV, I draw implications from Qatar and the Gulf regarding the
securitization of regulating migrants more generally.
I. QATAR, LAW

AND

SECURITY

Most Americans would be hard-pressed to locate Qatar on a
map, despite the fact that it is the only nation to begin with the
letter “Q” in the English language, and, more to the point, one of
the fastest-growing economies in the world.17 Until the end of the
twentieth century, it was a backwater trading post in the Middle
East.18 Qatar, like the other former Trucial States located on the
western shore of the Arabian Gulf, enjoyed limited political auton
omy and foreign relations protection by the British until gaining
independence comparatively late in 1971.19 Among many indica
tors of the country’s small size and recent nationhood, its first and
only public university opened in 1973.20
Yet, in May 2009, Qatar played host to perhaps the most illus
trious array of global legal luminaries in modern history. Hundreds
convened at the first Qatar Law Forum for three days to discuss
varied issues underscoring their shared commitment to the rule of
law.21 Attendees included prestigious judges, including the heads
of the International Court of Justice and the European Court of
Human Rights, numerous U.S. Federal District and Appeals Court
judges, prominent lawyers, and high-powered legal academics from
nearly fifty countries and six continents.22
17. See Gina Coleman, Qatar: The Fastest Growing Economy in the World, THE
MIDDLE EAST, (Apr. 2001), http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2742/is_2001_
April/ai_n25033766/pg_2/?tag=content;col1 (discussing the economic development of
Qatar); Moin Siddiqi, Qatar: A Beacon of Stability in Troubled Times, THE MIDDLE
EAST, (June 1, 2010), http://www.faqs.org/periodicals/201006/2063748211.html.
18. See ROSEMARIE SAID ZAHLAN, THE CREATION OF QATAR 11-24 (1979).
19. See id. at 106-07 (providing a detailed account of Qatar reaching statehood).
20. In 1973, Qatar founded two teacher colleges that provided the foundation for
a university in Qatar, which officially opened in 1977. Id. at 130-31; see also Asma al
Attiyah & Batoul Khalifa, Small Steps Lead to Quality Assurance and Enhancement in
Qatar University, 15 QUALITY IN HIGHER EDUC. 29, 29-38 (2009) (providing further
information about the development of education at Qatar University).
21. See Overview, QATAR LAW FORUM (May 31, 2009), http://www.qatarlaw
forum.com/en/qlf-overview (providing descriptions and links to media coverage of the
forum).
22. See Participants, QATAR LAW FORUM (May 31, 2009), http://www.qatarlaw
forum.com/en/qlf-participants.
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One of the United Kingdom’s pre-eminent jurists, former
Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Woolf, helped run the
meeting in his capacity as the President of a new court established
by Qatar’s government to resolve disputes related to the country’s
financial and construction projects.23 Professors and administrators
from Harvard Law School and several other important American
legal academies were among the Forum’s organizers.24 While the
Forum was sponsored and hosted by Qatar’s government and a pri
vate Arab foundation, the proceedings included copious advice by
mainly American and British jurists about how Qatar is and others
might learn from Anglo-American common law experience.25
Qatar’s unusual combination of extensive oil and natural gas
revenues and tiny native population enabled the government to
host an event like the Qatar Law Forum relatively affordably.26 At
the same time, particularly in light of the somewhat Western-centric
condescending tone of many of the Anglo-American speakers, the
question can certainly be raised of why Qatar did so. Here I sug
gest that the Forum is part of a broader phenomenon of law’s and
legal discourse’s import as a currency for national security issues
around national identity and non-citizen workers.
More basically, the Forum illustrated several important trends
about law in non-Western, rapidly-globalizing contexts like the oilrich states of the Eastern Arab world. Societies like Qatar, though
relative backwaters in the history of the Middle East, share with the
rest of the region a permeation of diverse, structured legal tradi
23. See Julia Berris, Lord Woolf, William Blair QC to Launch Qatar’s Commer
cial Court, THE LAWYER, (May 14, 2007), http://www.thelawyer.com/lord-woolf
william-blair-qc-to-launch-qatar’s-commercial-court/125782.article.
24. See Program, QATAR LAW FORUM (May 31, 2009), http://www.qatarlaw
forum.com/en/system/files/QLF.pdf [hereinafter Program].
25. An Introduction to the New Qatar International Judiciary, QATAR LAW FO
RUM (May 31, 2009), http://www.qatarlawforum.com/en/system/files/New+Qatar+
International+Judiciary.pdf [hereinafter An Introduction]. For instance, the panel dis
cussion titled “An Introduction to the new Qatar International Judiciary” was described
as “an opportunity for the members of the Qatar Financial Centre’s . . . new Civil and
Commercial Court and Regulatory Tribunal to introduce themselves,” but were pre
sided over primarily by Lord Woolf and Sir. William Blair of England, and focused
primarily on the ways that the two new entities should model the judiciary entities in
London. Id.
26. See Moin Siddiqi, Qatar: A Beacon of Stability in Troubled Times, THE MID
DLE EAST, June 1, 2010 (describing how Qatar’s wealth allowed the Qatar Law Forum
to take place); see also Francis Gibb, Qatar Law Forum: Anyone Who is Anyone Cele
brates the Rule of Law, THE SUNDAY TIMES, June 4, 2009, http://business.timesonline.
co.uk/tol/business/law/article6424382.ece (discussing the importance of the Qatar Law
Forum at a time of financial crisis).
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tions, especially that of the shari’a, or Islamic law.27 Nonetheless,
the dissolution of Islamic imperial control, and any imagined notion
of a united Islamic political community, or umma, along with the
collapse of the Ottomans by the end of World War I meant that
shari’a became a small part of a more complex mosaic of Western
and Middle Eastern legal systems.28
As a practical matter, this broad Middle Eastern phenomenon
was less sweeping in small desert trading post societies like Doha,
Qatar, and its neighbors than in central Arab population centers
like Egypt and Lebanon.29 Yet, the relegation to small spheres of
traditional Islamic law throughout the Arab world meant that even
in tiny trading posts, shari’a began to take on more of a role as a
symbolic reference point than a central focal point of governance.30
In short, after nearly a century of Western legal control or influ
ence, Arab states had legal systems that merged many diverse ele
ments in a social context in which one of the least utilized—Islamic
law—was both more established and more legitimate historically.31
The small Arab trading backwaters grouped together under
British external control and protection, as the Trucial States, includ
ing contemporary Qatar, were distinct variations of this pattern
mostly because their legal systems had not seen the centralization,
secularization, and grafting of Western European legal codes that
marked the more populous Arab former colonies of France and the
UK.32 For a place like Qatar, this simply meant that a legal system
was not sufficiently in place to handle the breakneck growth that
occurred in recent oil-rich decades, while Islamic sources of law re
mained popular, if ambiguous.
Amidst this backdrop, Qatar, like other Arab states, has had
increasing connections to a Western foreign policy industry, with
27. NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD 175-85 (1997)
[hereinafter THE RULE OF LAW].
28. See NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD
162-80 (Shahrough Akhavi & Said Amir Arjomand eds., 2002) [hereinafter NONCON
STITUTIONAL WORLD].
29. THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 185-86.
30. NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD, supra note 28, at 162-80.
31. Id.
32. There are several major differences that separate Qatar’s contemporary con
text towards migration from other Arab nations. These include their great relative
wealth, their general rejection of the concept of foreigners naturalizing, and that they
were “never officially a colony of any European power” (although they were a “pro
tected state” under the British rule). Sharon Nagy, Making Room for Migrants, Making
Sense of Difference: Spatial and Ideological Expressions of Social Diversity in Urban
Qatar, 43 URB. STUD. 119, 121 (2006).

R
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the United States at the center; this industry aims to enhance the
rule of law in non-Western countries.33 This recent vintage of legal
ist wine fits partly in the old bottles of “law and development” prac
titioners in the 1960s and 1970s.34 At the same time, contemporary
U.S. rule-of-law reform efforts take place in a setting of globalized
inter-connectedness,35 where international law and the legal norms
of one society are easily accessible and often salient elsewhere,36
and where Arab domestic and regional legal initiatives are signifi
cant, as the Qatar Law Forum exemplified.37
Multiple and contending discourses and practices around the
rule of law suggest a complex picture for the politics of Western
rule-of-law aid. Nonetheless, the basic message is non-Western
countries intent on hyper-globalized growth should move to con
form with Western ideas of the rule of law, both in terms of busi
ness law and human rights. This is analogous and connected to the
notion that emerged in the 1990s in the economic sphere that nonWestern countries should move towards observance of a set of neo
33. For trends on increasing connections to Western foreign policy, see Rami
Khouri, Director, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the
American University of Beirut, Lecture at Georgetown University: America, the Mid
dle East, and the Gulf: An Arab View of Challenges Facing the Next U.S. Administra
tion (Aug. 24, 2008), in 1 CIRS BRIEF 1 (2008), available at http://www12.georgetown.
edu/sfs/qatar/cirs/EnglishRamiKhouriBrief.pdf. The contemporary rule-of-law aid
movement generally dates back to the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the
rapid political and economic reform needs of Eastern European and Baltic countries.
See generally Thomas Carothers, Rule of Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
LAW ABROAD 3, 8 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). Substantial rule-of-law projects are
implemented through the U.S. governments’ Department of State and Agency for In
ternational Development, as well as semi-autonomous organizations like the U.S. Insti
tute for Peace and private contractors. Id. at 10. In the case of Middle East work,
much of the funding and the recent expansion in programs have taken place through
the Middle East Partnership Initiative. See U.S. State Dep’t., About MEPI, THE MID
DLE E. PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE, http://mepi.state.gov/about-us.html (last visited Nov.
20, 2010). In the current strategic plan of the U.S. Department of State and Agency for
International Development, rule-of-law reform aid was the top priority within its sec
ond broad policy strategy of “[g]overning [j]ustly and [d]emocratically.” U.S. Depart
ment of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, Strategic Plan: Fiscal
Years 2007-2012 18-19 (2007).
34. Carothers, supra note 33, at 15-16.
35. See, e.g., DAVID HELD, ANTHONY MCGREW, DAVID GOLDBLATT &
JONATHAN PERRATON, GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CUL
TURE (1999).
36. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155,
1155-56 (2007); see also Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Sept. 25, 2008, at 50 (discussing the connection of U.S. judges to foreign legal
norms).
37. See Program, supra note 24 (providing a program, including a list of topics).

R
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liberal economic measures known in the developmental economic
policy world as the Washington Consensus.38
As Qatar has transformed rapidly through oil revenues into a
dynamic engine of global growth, it has come increasingly under the
scrutiny of Western governments, whose corporations have rushed
to take advantage of the tiny country’s opportunities.39 Thus, the
central event of the Qatar Law Forum, the unveiling of the
sheikhdom’s new tribunal to resolve commercial and other civil dis
putes arising from construction projects in the small country, was,
not surprisingly, a clear symbolic assertion of Qatar’s conformity
with global legal standards.40
Yet, it is far from inevitable that legal standards facilitating
Western business involvement and international human rights work
together in harmony. This is particularly the case in Gulf countries
like Qatar that manifest a second trend that was clear to partici
pants in the Qatar Law Forum. The event, which took place at one
of Doha’s fanciest hotels, was staffed by hundreds of workers of
diverse non-Qatari nationality.41 Because of the sharp discontinu
ity of Qatar’s small indigenous population and the tremendous
growth plans which oil has made possible, the country has brought
hundreds and thousands of workers from throughout the world to
build, manage, teach, and work in domestic households.42 This
rapid population influx has left the native population and
workforce a tiny minority of less than 10% in their own country.43
38. CLEMENT M. HENRY & ROBERT SPRINGBORG, GLOBALIZATION AND THE
POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 15 (Eugene L. Rogan ed., 2001). For
more on the Washington Consensus and its application to Arab states of the Middle
East and North Africa, see id. at ch. 1-2.
39. See From Deleware to Doha: the Legal Environment Necessary for Corporate
Centres and Thriving Financial Markets, QATAR LAW FORUM (May 30, 2009), http://
www.qatarlawforum.com/en/system/files/From_Delaware_to_Doha.pdf. One of the
panels at the Forum, entitled “From Delaware to Doha,” explored the legal elements
that Qatar would need to adopt to promote it as a global financial center. See id.
40. See Gibb, supra note 26. Two of the main events of the Forum included:
“Qatar’s new commercial and civil court, set up by Lord Woolf (its president) and
staffed by former UK judges” and “regulatory tribunal under Sir William Blair, the
High Court judge.” Id.
41. I had the privilege of attending and observed this myself.
42. See Claude Berrebi, Francisco Martorell & Jeffery C. Tanner, Qatar’s Labor
Markets at a Crucial Crossroad, 63 MIDDLE EAST J. 421, 430 (2009) (discussing Qatar’s
population growth due to immigration and its economic dependency upon foreign
workers).
43. According to the U.S. State Department, “[f]oreign workers comprise as
much as 85% of the total population and make up about 90% of the total labor force.”
BACKGROUND NOTE: QATAR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5437.htm.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE103.txt

130

unknown

Seq: 10

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

27-SEP-11

10:03

[Vol. 33:121

And therein lies the real story behind the story of the Qatar
Law Forum. Qatar, like other Arab societies of the Persian Gulf,
depends on massive influxes of migrant workers to carry out its
growth.44 Yet, the demographic balance this has created, in making
natives a small group within their own society, fosters a ready per
ception of non-citizen residents as a challenge to national security
and emergent identity.45 As a result, countries like Qatar have gen
erally set up a system of foreign worker sponsorship, known there
and elsewhere in Arab Gulf countries as kefala, in which workers
are tied to their employers and citizenship or even permanent mi
gration is not possible.46
This, in turn, has drawn the scrutiny of global rights groups,
who insist that the working conditions for many foreign workers in
the region violate international law.47 And, between the critical
role national and transnational levels of law play in making sense of
globalization48 and the historically salient legitimacy of shari’a, the
legal sphere is central as a practical and symbolic place where the
nature and rules around work, citizenship, and identity are
contested.
The interplay between large migrant labor populations and
small groups of natives thus produces a push-pull dynamic of signif
icant global pressures on Gulf governments like Qatar to improve
their fealty to human rights, along with concerns from local citi
zens that the identity and social cohesion of their countries
might be undermined should migrants be able to stay indef
initely or acquire citizenship.49 As a partial result of this dy
44. Berrebi et al., supra note 42, at 430-32.
45. Rainer Baubock,
¨
How Migration Transforms Citizenship: International, Mul
tinational, and Transnational Perspectives 11 (IWE, Working Paper Series, Feb. 24,
2002), available at http://www.eif.oeaw.ac.at/downloads/workingpapers/IWE-Papers/
WP24.pdf (discussing the Gulf state’s strategy of formally rejecting citizenship of mi
grant workers to prevent challenges to the concept of national identity). For example,
women in Qatar increasingly feel insecure about walking in their neighborhoods be
cause of the influx of foreign workers. Nagy, supra note 32, at 126.
46. ANH NGA LONGVA, WALLS BUILT ON SAND: MIGRATION, EXCLUSION, AND
SOCIETY IN KUWAIT 94-97 (1997).
47. See UAE: Meetings Should Address Migrant Workers’ Rights, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Jan, 20, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/01/17/uae-meetings-should
address-migrant-workers-rights.
48. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS (2006); Robert
Howse, Book Review–The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121
HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1529-30 (2008).
49. This push-pull relationship is evident in an interview with Dahi Khalfan
Tamin, police chief of the Qatari police force. After stating great concern for the Arab
identity in response to the influx of immigrant workers, he laments that Qatar may have
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namic,50 Gulf governments expend significant resources to improve
their global image with respect to the rule of law, such as the Qatar
Law Forum.51 This is because it is easier for wealthy countries with
small populations to spend money to put on a global conference on
law than it is to balance the difficult and diverse transnational and
national pressures involved in increasing migrant workers’ legal
rights.
Thus, the rule of law, as it applies to native identity, workers’
rights, and international legal actors, is crucial to the politics of the
contemporary Persian Gulf, and takes on unique aspects with the
rapidity of Gulf societies’ oil-driven growth and globalization.52 In
other words, if the status of migrant workers is central to Arab Gulf
concerns about security, then law is the means through which this
security issue is regulated. This means that the rule of law is the
major arena through which the politics of security are contested
symbolically, similar to the way that missiles and deterrence formed
the core of symbolic politics around security in the US during the
Cold War era. In short, the rule of law in societies like Qatar is a
critical currency of national security concerns, and this helps ac
count for the emphasis the small country put on staging the Qatar
Law Forum.
The rule of law in Qatar and similar wealthy, rapidly globaliz
ing Arab countries has multiple dimensions. This has to do with the
centrality that a relatively conservative version of Islam plays as the
social and cultural glue for the small native population of such
to bow to the pressures of foreign human rights organizations. See Update: Expatirates
Are the Future Threat of the Entire Gulf: HE Dahi Khalfan Tamim: Excerpts from the
Interview of Dahi Khalfan Tamim in a Qatar Television Show Titled ‘Laqum Al Qarar’
(The Decision is Yours), THE PENINSULA, Dec. 29, 2010, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.
com/qatar/137276-fupdate-expatriates-are-the-future-threat-of-the-entire-gulf-he-dahi
khalfan-tamim.html.
50. I do not explore directly in this Article the obvious economic incentives for
Gulf governments to put in place legal provisions that attract foreign investment, al
though this clearly undergirds my broader arguments about national security in the
pages that follow.
51. Other examples of Qatar’s dedication to improving its global image can be
seen in a 2003 60 Minutes television interview. See 60 Minutes: Qatar Embracing De
mocracy, (CBS television broadcast Aug. 3, 2003), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2003/07/25/60minutes/main565155.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;1 (providing a transcript
of the broadcast); see also Qatar Embracing Democracy, (CBS television broadcast
Aug. 3, 2003), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6kU9gkmrmxg&feature=
related (providing actual interview video uploaded to YouTube and available as of last
visit on Nov. 20, 2010).
52. See LONGVA, supra note 46, at 7 (providing a specific study of how migration
has been an integral part of a Persian Gulf State).
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countries.53 The issue is not so much one of social conformity or
lack of tolerance; rather, it is that places like Qatar have, and are
likely to continue to have, codified endorsements of Islam as the
established state religion and the official basis of all legislation.54
Yet this accompanies a great deal of social change around the broad
theme of rapid socioeconomic and cultural growth, with extraordi
narily rapid connections to global business and tourism.
The multiplicity of rule-of-law discourse is also due to the em
bedded conflict in the two broad aims of Western legalist reform.
First, there is an economic stake in facilitating stable market and
property transactions for transnational capital.55 Second, there is a
political concern for improving individual rights and opening up the
political process in aid-recipient countries.56 These two goals may
not be mutually reinforcing.57 Indeed, efforts to enhance the rule
of law to improve the predictability of market transactions and the
reliability of contracts can accompany, and possibly enhance, non
democratic regime stability.
Much of the question of how to resolve the possible embedded
contradiction between the rule of law as a business-facilitator and a
rights-facilitator in countries like Qatar hinges on the relation be
tween internal Arab politics, with its tropes of political legitimation,
and external political influences. Although the roles of courts and
lawyers in the West suggest associations between legalism and liber
ties, social scientists, and policy practitioners have few conclusions
about what actually works in liberalizing rule-of-law promotion in
non-democratic settings.58 This problem of knowledge is especially
acute in the Arab world. Arab states generally share two features
53. THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 184-86.
54. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 43 (stating that Qatar’s state religion is
Islam).
55. Timothy W. Luke, Dependent Development and the Arab OPEC States, 45 J.
POL. 979, 979-1003 (1983). This dependence is still implied because of Qatar’s heavy
reliance on oil. According to reporting on a 2003 broadcast of CBS Sunday Morning,
“Barely one percent of Qatar’s land is arable, but it holds substantial oil, and enough
estimated natural gas reserves to supply the U.S. market for the next 200 years.” Sun
day Morning: Qatar in Transition, (CBS television broadcast Mar. 2, 2003), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/27/sunday/main542281.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;2;
see also AAMIR A. REHMAN, DUBAI & CO.: GLOBAL STRATEGIES FOR DOING BUSI
NESS IN THE GULF STATES 80 (2008).
56. RHONDA L. CALLAWAY & ELIZABETH G. MATTHEWS, STRATEGIC US FOR
EIGN ASSISTANCE: THE BATTLE BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY
9-12, 28 (2008).
57. Id.
58. LAWRENCE C. MAYER ET AL., COMPARITIVE POLITICS 330-33 (2001).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE103.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 13

DISPATCHES FROM THE ARABIAN GULF

27-SEP-11

10:03

133

that render external rule-of-law aid particularly difficult—long
standing nondemocratic governments, and legal systems that graft
Ottoman, European, and contemporary sources onto residual Is
lamic norms.59
In Arab Gulf societies like Qatar, these challenges go along
with the peculiar demographic and political issue that establishing
true equality of rights between natives and the large majority non
native citizen workers would endanger both identity and stability of
these young, rapidly-growing and non-elected political systems. At
the same time, the tension between maximizing open business con
nections for Western firms and policing international rights viola
tions of workers provides temptations for privileged outsiders to
turn something of a blind eye to the rights problems in practice.60
All of this was on prominent display at the Qatar Law Forum,
where there were some, albeit mostly limited, abstract disagree
ments or divergent emphases on Western and Arab implementa
tions of the rule of law, while migrant mostly non-Western workers
in the area surrounding the conference hotel carried out their long
shifts under exploitative conditions in at least some cases.61
This is not to suggest that either Gulf Arabs or American legal
reformers are monolithic in their general attitudes towards the rule
of law, democracy, or the treatment of migrant workers. Certainly,
many, perhaps most, Arabs desire more predictable, responsive,
59. THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 2-5 (providing information on European
and Ottoman influences in drafting the legal systems). Moreover, U.S. rule-of-law advi
sors face an added daunting impediment: widespread, twofold Arab skepticism about
the United States as the messenger for the rule of law in the Middle East. Aziz AlAzmeh, Populism Contra Democracy: Recent Democratist Discourse in the Arab World,
in DEMOCRACY WITHOUT DEMOCRATS?: THE RENEWAL OF POLITICS IN THE MUSLIM
WORLD 112 (Ghassan Salamé ed., 2001). Many Arabs believe that U.S. policy makers
neither know nor care to know basic aspects of law, politics, and society in Arab coun
tries. Jacqueline Shoen, Practice What you Preach, MAJALLA, Mar. 4, 2011, http://www.
majalla.com/en/ideas/article300246.ece. And, there is an even stronger and equally
widespread perception that the United States follows in the tradition of earlier Western
powers in not always practicing globally what it preaches about the rule of law, particu
larly in the Middle East. Id.
60. See, e.g., Daniel Heradstveit & G. Matthew Bohnam, The Psychology of Cor
ruption in Azerbaijan and Iran, in OIL IN THE GULF: OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT 72, 80 (Daniel Heradstveit & Helg Hveem eds., 2004) (asserting that
prominent members of the political opposition in Azerbaijan expressed “disappoint
ment that Western oil companies can make profitable agreements with a dictator who
does not hesitate to violate human rights”).
61. See Asian Migrant Workers Abandoned to Abuse, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec.
17, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/12/18/asian-migrant-workers-abandoned
abuse (providing a general description about the abuses faced by migrant workers in
the Middle East).
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and fair laws, as attention continues to highlight the problems and
prospects for political change in the region.62 The 2004 Arab
Human Development Report is one prominent statement by Arabs
of the central importance of the rule of law to social improvement,
and the statement was repeated in the more recent 2009 report.63
Indeed, the most transparent purpose of the Qatar Law Forum
was to demonstrate and improve global commitment to the rule of
law.64 At the same time, the small, wealthy Arab state’s self-posi
tioning at the center of transnational legalism is also a clear attempt
to gloss over the difficult role law must play in the government’s
difficult task of shoring up citizens’ rights and privileges as a tiny
minority amidst one of the world’s largest and most globally diverse
migrant labor markets. The fact that Qatar’s demographic compo
sition makes this issue distinctly one of national security, I suggest,
creates some of its particular difficulties, as well as highlighting a
different approach to non-native rights as a national security prob
lem than that of the United States.
II. ARAB RULES

OF

LAW

UNDER

GLOBALIZATION

The analysis so far provides a flavor for how issues of the rule
of law, migration, and national identity may be both particularly
salient and contested in the contemporary young Arab states bor
dering the Persian Gulf. This section adds analytical weight to this
62. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME REG’L BUREAU FOR ARAB STATES,
ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004: TOWARD FREEDOM IN THE ARAB WORLD
165 (2004), http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2004e.pdf. Randomsample survey research on political topics is increasingly available for at least some
Arab societies. For example, the World Values Survey now includes Algeria, Egypt,
Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. See Mark Tessler, Do Islamic Orientations
Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence from the World
Values Survey in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Algeria, in VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS OF
THE ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN PUBLICS 105, 122 (Mansoor Moaddel, ed., 2007);
see also JAMES ZOGBY, WHAT ARABS THINK, at iii (2002) (providing a study asking
general questions regarding political issues to Arabs from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Leba
non, Kuwait, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia); CDDRL Inaugu
rates New Program on Political Reform in the Arab World, FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTIT.
FOR INT’L STUDIES AT STANFORD U. (May 10, 2010), http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/
6102/Arab_Reform_Conference_Report-37.pdf (providing a succinct summary of the
question of political change in Arab countries).
63. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, REG’L BUREAU FOR ARAB
STATES, ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2009: CHALLENGES TO HUMAN SECUR
ITY IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES 7, 69, 193 (July 21, 2009), http://www.arab-hdr.org/
publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2009e.pdf.
64. See Mission Statement, QATAR LAW FORUM (May 30, 2009), http://qatarlaw
forum.com/en/qatar-law-forum.
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sketch. Because law, migrant workers, and nationhood are so inter
twined and fluid in countries like Qatar, the question of migrants’
legal status is securitized. That is to say, migrant workers’ rights are
so caught up in basic issues of legal development and political iden
tity that this topic has an apparently organic connection to national
security.
The broad context of legal growth and migrant human rights in
Qatar comes from the particular Arab historical juxtaposition of a
well-developed legal order, the shari’a, and subsequent experience
with the imperial implementation of Western legal norms in the
Middle East and North Africa.65 If countries like Qatar are eager
to show fealty to global understandings of the rule of law, this does
not necessarily make their citizens readily accepting of the idea that
Western lawyers and advisors should tell them how to build or
change their legal systems.
In part, this is because of confusion in the multiple ways that
the rule of law is conceptualized. If “[t]he rule of law . . . stands in
the peculiar state of being the preeminent legitimizing ideal in the
world today,”66 its many possible definitions have led some theo
rists to dismiss the significance of “this bit of ruling-class chatter.”67
In particular, the rule of law tends to move between general ideals
of equality, fairness, and perhaps the protection of individual rights,
on the one hand,68 to specific institutional arrangements, on the
other. Yet understanding how the rule of law as an ideal can link to
specific institutions and reforms is not well-theorized.
There is little empirical research as to how legalist ideals and
practices are connected in Arab societies.69 Yet, the rule of law has
65. THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 179-85.
66. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 4
(2004).
67. Judith Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW:
IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1, 1 (Alan Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, eds., 1987).
68. Danilo Zolo, The Rule of Law: A Critical Reappraisal, in THE RULE OF LAW:
HISTORY, THEORY AND CRITICISM 3, 55 (Pietro Costa & Danilo Zolo, eds., 2007).
69. Existing work tends to focus on judicial opinions and the function of courts,
rather than on whether or how popular understanding of or respect for law may matter
to legal and political systems more generally. See generally THE RULE OF LAW IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(Eugene Cotran & Mai Yamani eds., 2000) (exploring whether and to what extent the
international standards of human rights should be observed in Middle Eastern and Is
lamic countries). As insightful and important as this research is, both its sparseness and
lack of specific argument as to how legal functionaries contribute to broader rule-of-law
ideals or liberalizing political outcomes serve to underscore the problem of knowledge
for rule-of-law programs in places like the Middle East. But see generally THE RULE OF
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long been critical as doctrine in the Arab world. The Middle East
ern origin of two of the most renowned, ancient legal codes—the
Code of Hammurabi and the Judeo-Christian Bible—should not be
forgotten. More to the point, Islamic and Ottoman socio-legal tra
ditions that contribute to contemporary Arab law predate the Anglo-American common law by centuries.70 Thus, discussion about
the reformist pressures on the rule of law in Arab states cannot
proceed without recognition that the general concept has deep Mid
dle Eastern roots. Indeed, Islam’s long history of prioritizing law
and mechanisms for its evolution mean that one indigenous Arab
version of rule-of-law ideals remains very popular today.71
More specifically, Islam originated as a social system that com
bined “din wadawla,” religion, and polity.72 Naturally, law
emerged as the central glue to guide the growth and administration
of the millions of people throughout the Middle East, North Africa,
and Southern Europe who comprised the early Islamic empire from
the seventh through the thirteenth centuries.73 While facets of con
temporary Western and global articulation of the rule of law cannot
simply be retro-fitted or read into Islamic political history, the core
term for Islamic law, shari’a, prioritizes legal order and brings to
gether legal doctrine and judicial decisions.74 In other words, this
traditional Arab Islamic term itself is one way of translating, if not
necessarily transplanting, some of what is understood as the rule of
law; it is likely to be viewed by many Muslim Arabs as the correct
Arabic term for the concept. In general, then, the idea of the rule
of law was central and well-developed within Islam; political institu
tional practice was the problem.75
The complex political and doctrinal history of shari’a merits far
more detailed treatment than can be undertaken here. Yet, several
LAW, supra note 27, at 187-220 (providing information on courts in Arab countries that
provides insights regarding embedded Arab authoritarian politics).
70. Compare ANTHONY BLACK, THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT
9-13 (2001) (discussing the foundations of Islam in the seventh century), with KEVIN M.
TEEVEN, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 1-5 (1990) (discussing
the foundation of Anglo-American common law during the thirteenth century).
71. NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 20-21 (2008).
72. ERWIN ISAK JAKOB ROSENTHAL, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM
8-9 (1968).
73. See W.M. BALLANTYNE, ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES ON ARAB LAWS 34-35
(2000).
74. FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 117-21.
75. See KHALED ABOU EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY
12-16 (2004) (providing a general account of the tension between the ideal and practice
of the rule of law in Islam).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-1\WNE103.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 17

DISPATCHES FROM THE ARABIAN GULF

27-SEP-11

10:03

137

significant points, though they might be partial over-simplifications,
facilitate an appreciation of the ongoing influence of Islamic ideals
in the contemporary Arab politics of the rule of law. First, Islamic
law evolved and grew mainly through the role and efforts of schol
ars and judges, but without an ironclad institutional check on the
power of rulers. This led the conflict between the empowering and
power-enabling tendencies of law to resolve ultimately towards the
latter.76 Second, the ideals of Islamic politics and the rule of law
remained a useful political language after the end of Islamic gov
ernment in much of the Middle East and North Africa.77 Moreo
ver, the scholarly, non-codified history of Islamic law is closer to the
Anglo-American common law tradition than subsequent major le
gal influences in many Middle Eastern countries.78 This Article ex
plains each of these points in turn.
First, because Islam emerged rapidly as a system of social gov
ernance, as well as a creed, it is hardly surprising that a law-forming
class of Muslims also developed quickly.79 Religious scholars were
the natural source for legal interpretation, because Muhammad’s
Islamic status as God’s final Prophet meant that either his recorded
prophecies in the Qur’an or the sayings (hadith) quotes attributed
to him otherwise, collectively known as the sunna, formed the basis
of the most reliable dicta for ordering society.80
Moreover, the relatively small number of explicitly legal
passages in the Qur’an and the governing challenges that grew with
the spectacular expansion of Islam in the several centuries after
Muhammad’s death meant that legal needs and sources were too
diverse to allow for simple derivation from the founding documents
of the religion.81 Over time, scholars built an elaborate intellectual
interpretative edifice to find ways to codify and extend through rea
76. ALEXANDER D. KNYSH, IBN ‘ARABI IN THE LATER ISLAMIC TRADITION 56-57
(1999).
77. See FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 4-7.
78. See RAFAEL DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW 19-21 (2010) (providing a
general comparison of common law and shari’a).
79. BLACK, supra note 70, at 32-37 (providing a general history of the rise of a
law-forming class).
80. See id. at 10-11 (providing a discussion of Muhammad’s prophesies in the
Qur’an and his sayings as a basis for societal order).
81. After Muhammad’s death, scholars took on the role of interpreting the
Qur’an and shari’a. FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 23-25. Twentieth century experiments
in Iran, in which the government was run almost entirely under scholarly rule, have not
increased basic political rights associated with the rule of law, transparency, or due pro
cess, thus showing the importance of balance and checks of power between the scholar
and the governing powers. Id. at 134-37.
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son and analogy (qiyas), consensus (ijma’) and interpretation (ij
tihad) these original authoritative sources of Islam.82 The result
was a diverse, non-monolithic, and long-lasting system of jurispru
dence and social growth with built-in emphases on expert knowl
edge and consensus, not unlike the development of contemporary
international law.83
One of the central, enduring doctrines of Islamic jurisprudence
was the leader’s status as custodian or servant of communal law,
rather than its progenitor.84 Rulers were to be judged by qualified
Islamic scholars and Muslims generally on their record of executing
and enforcing Islamic law.85 This clear theoretical limit to the
leader’s legislative powers and discretion was subject to the realities
of a depoliticized, diffuse, pre-modern imperial citizenry, which
could both allow centralized political excess or heighten the impor
tance of the scholars’ work.86 Yet Islamic law’s dependency on
scholars meant that the ruling political elite “was largely, if not to
tally, absent from the legal scene.”87 Thus, Islamic scholars exer
cised a major, often practical, role in granting or withholding
legitimacy to the leader.
The range and power of the Arab Islamic and subsequent Ot
toman Islamic empires decreased over time, while Western eco
nomic and military power posed a doctrinal and practical challenge
to Muslim political order in the Middle East and North Africa. In
the broad context of Western imperial expansion, Islamic political
order began to take a back seat to the beginnings of local national
ism and efforts at centralization. Whatever the particular cause,88
the ideal and reality of Islamic government, including the central
place of the rule of law as a check on arbitrary authority, dimin
ished until its death blow after World War I.89 At that point, the
Islamic Ottoman Empire disappeared and the Arab regions were
82. E.g., Chibli Mallat, From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law: A Restatement of the
Field (Part II), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 209, 285 (2004).
83. FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 4-7.
84. BLACK, supra note 70, at 109-11.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. WAEL HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW 204 (2005).
88. There are divergent accounts that nonetheless concur on the importance of
legal scholars in developing shari’a and the roots of the collapse of Islamic legal institu
tions in modern political developments. FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 59-75; HALLAQ,
supra note 87, at 205.
89. Youssef M. Choueiri, Review Article: The Middle East: Colonialism, Islam and
the Nation State, 37 J. OF CONTEMP. HIST. 649, 651 (2002).
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divided up into mostly colonial enclaves.90 More to the point, the
system of scholars that upheld the rule of law disappeared, and,
with it, the rule of law itself other than a term for colonial govern
ment enforcement and bureaucratic centralization.91
The failure of Muslim Arab states to resist modern Western
domination doomed Islam as the ideological basis for organizing
government in most of the Middle East for the colonial and early
post-colonial periods.92 Yet, a second important point here is that
Islamic political theory remained a significant source of basic ideals,
particularly with respect to the rule of law.93 One relevant norma
tive influence is justice as a value that is centrally and popularly
embedded in Islam.94 Justice as a concept and a discourse is ubiqui
tous in the Qur’an.95 Moreover, as is true with American legal ide
als, Islam’s emphasis on justice in the sunna includes significant
attention to social equity and individual rights.96 Thus, discussions
of many of the issues that frame legal discourse are engrained in the
religious identity of a large majority of the people in Arab societies.
The importance of justice within Islam also contributed to the fact
that Islamic jurisprudence never fully developed a concept of natu
ral law. This has led some to argue that there is no clear theory to
ground a completely secular legal order, as natural law helped to do
over time in the West.97
Islamic political theory can be read as presupposing two more
specific tenets that have clear relevance to contemporary Western
ideas about the rule of law: (a) that despite the ideal that political
authority exists for the benefit of Islam, authority in practice will
tend toward absolutism, rather than subordinating itself to commu
nal legitimacy or justice; and (b) that resources autonomous from
the state are needed to check leaders’ actions.98 This classical Is
lamic distrust of government and an emphasis on law as a constraint
90. Id.
91. FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 81-82.
92. Id. at 105-46.
93. Id. at 4-7.
94. For general discussion of justice and the Quran, see ABOU EL FADL, supra
note 75, at 18-23.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 23-30.
97. GEORGE N. SFEIR, MODERNIZATION OF THE LAW IN ARAB STATES 11-12
(1998).
98. For a discussion of this fragmented “problem of power,” see MAYER ET AL.,
supra note 58, at 45.
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on authority helped ground the influence of Islamic scholars and
would sound quite familiar to many Americans.99
Such familiarity is not coincidental. As legal anthropologist
Lawrence Rosen and others have noted, Islamic law is essentially a
common law system, especially in its reliance on local courts and
local cultural information as characteristics that distinguish both
from the legal centralization of a civil law system.100 Thus, Ameri
can and Arab lawyers may share a similar understanding of the im
portance of locally based legal processes, among other concepts.
Islamic legal development, unlike Anglo-American common law,
derived doctrine more from scholarly opinion and consensus, which
tended to be brief and not necessarily prone to creating binding
precedent, than through judicial opinions.101
By the twentieth century, Islamic legal rule had been largely
banished and tarnished in Arab countries, reduced to the sphere of
family law by Western colonial rulers and rejected by many natives
who saw Islamic government as outmoded or ineffective in the face
of European power.102 At the same time, late-Ottoman centraliza
tion and subsequent foreign great power control of law in the Mid
dle East and North Africa fostered three major consequences.
First, this produced a patchwork of legal orders in a given society,
rather than the relatively long-standing growth of a unitary national
legal system such as that which occurred in the United States.103
Second, it set up an authoritarian norm that law would in fact be
subordinated to imperial political power.104 And, third, it spurred
on a tendency for constitutions to exist without a significant history
of judicial interpretation.105 In some states, such as Morocco, this
led to frequent postcolonial redrafts of the constitution to reflect
changes in the power or preoccupations of political authority, in
99. Ellis Goldberg, Private Goods, Public Wrongs and Civil Society in Some Me
dieval Arab Theory and Practice, in RULES AND RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: DEMOC
RACY, LAW, AND SOCIETY 251, 255-63 (Ellis Goldberg, Resat Kasaba, and Joel S.
Migdal eds., 1993).
100. LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE JUSTICE OF ISLAM 48-49 (2000).
101. CHIBLI MALLAT, INTRODUCTION TO MIDDLE EASTERN LAW 61 (2007).
102. Id. at 132-33. Feldman also discusses the inner decay of the end of the schol
ars’ role within the ruling class at the end of the Ottoman Empire. FELDMAN, supra
note 71, at 88-91.
103. For a comparison of constitutions in the West, including the United States,
and the Middle East see NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD, supra note 28, at 105-10.
104. THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 12.
105. NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD, supra note 28, at 106.
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contrast with the United States norm of a single, basic constitu
tional document that can only be modified with difficulty.106
The legal system of every contemporary Arab nation is a
unique mixture of Islamic, Ottoman, European, and post-indepen
dence laws.107 This mélange of legal sources in most Arab societies
did not in itself preclude legal clarity or checks on authority. How
ever, along with the lapses in territorial and ethnic logic that Euro
pean colonial powers frequently employed in setting borders for
many of the contemporary nations of the Middle East, the lack of
legal systemic unity in Arab states has two consequences for recent
United States-fostered efforts to enhance the rule of law.108 It
means that the jurisprudential reference points of lawyers in the
United States are not likely to be of direct use to Arab societies.
More importantly, the patchwork of legal systems in Arab societies
has contributed to political situations in which postcolonial Arab
leaders have had many incentives to centralize their authority and
no real legal impediments to doing so.109
This latter point is even more obviously related to the primary
legacy of colonialism in the Middle East—an emphasis on control
backed by force that was meant to serve the best interests of the
colonizer, rather than of indigenous citizens. The political example
that socialized Arab nationalist elites was colonial regimes’ resort
to invented political forms like mandates and protectorates to oc
clude their exercise of raw power.110 Legal norms and institutions
under colonialism made readily apparent the contradictions be
tween stated and true purposes.111
At the same time, these norms and institutions were somewhat
successful at centralizing political and economic administration.
However much Arab nationalists rebelled against colonial rule,
they also learned that the lofty promises of colonial political ideas
were generally subservient, or even in direct contrast, to the reality
106. PHILLIP C. NAYLOR, NORTH AFRICA: A HISTORY FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE
PRESENT 228-29 (2009).
107. For a succinct summary of the combination of sources of law in each Arab
area, see THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 3-5. To be sure, a number of territories
escaped direct foreign domination, most notably in the Persian Gulf. See MALLAT,
supra note 101, at 243. Yet, even in these places, Western legal ideas and practices have
supplemented indigenous combinations of Islamic and customary law. THE RULE OF
LAW, supra note 27, at 518.
108. OWEN, supra note 6, at 11.
109. THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 27, at 11-18.
110. E.g., EUGENE ROGAN, THE ARABS 219 (2009).
111. OWEN, supra note 6, at 14.
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of police control.112 It is small wonder, facing severe economic and
other challenges, that these nationalists built on, instead of disman
tled, the legacies of authoritarian rule that they inherited.
To be sure, the ideal of the rule of law will often be at odds
with the centralizing tendency of governments. I argue that Arab
states in the Middle East in general had an especially wide gap be
tween the ideal and the reality because of the combination of the
relative lack of autonomous, pre-colonial, unified legal order in
these states and the particular repressive nature of colonial govern
ments. More subtly, I am suggesting that the level of discontinuity
between the rational, legalistic values preached by European ad
ministrators and their practice of resource extraction and police
rule tainted the global, secular ideal of the rule of law in a way that
is unlikely to resonate with the socialization of many American law
yers and that can complicate many Arabs’ credence of the sincerity
of international legal actors and doctrines.
Thus, it is easy for Arabs to view Western lawyers and interna
tional legal ideas in the West as primarily an ideology of political
control, and not as a possible check on political abuse or guarantee
of individual rights. This is important because it implies that efforts
by reformers to strengthen the rule of law, and particularly central
legal institutions, need not be associated with political opening
within Arab societies.113
Despite their general legacy of political authoritarianism, Arab
regimes have not lacked at least partially clear legal structures. For
example, most Arab states have basic laws or constitutions but little
recent history of independent judicial review.114 The evidence is
that Arab leaders take their constitutions seriously, but mostly as
112. Eg., ROGAN, supra note 110, at 206.
113. A striking example of how well-formulated ideas of the rule of law can exist
alongside repressive political tendencies was the publication by an Iraqi law professor
of a thoughtful tract on the rule of law as an ideal in Iraq at the very same time that
Saddam Hussein was beginning to consolidate his particular style of brutal (and often
legally arbitrary) authoritarian rule. SAMIR KHAIRI TAWFIQ, MABDA SIYADAT AL
QA’NUN [THE PRINCIPLE OF THE RULE OF LAW] (1978). “Considering that it was pub
lished a year before Saddam Hussein moved from partial to undisputed political control
of Iraq, this thoughtful, philosophical discussion of the rule of law in terms that would
sound familiar to Western legal scholars is a particularly interesting treatise on the sub
ject in the Arabic language.” David M. Mednicoff, Legalism Sans Frontieres? U.S.
Rule-of-Law Aid in the Arab World 17 n.17 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Pa
per No. 61, 2005), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/cp61.mednicoff.
final.pdf.
114. See NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD, supra note 28, at 35-94, 143-60.
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legitimizing documents, rather than sets of provisions enforceable
by independent reviewers.115
In short, Arab citizens have two broad historical touchstones
with respect to the rule of law. One is the twentieth century experi
ence of codified law from many, including Western sources, most
often being used to support centralized, non-democratic rule.116 A
second is the vague collective knowledge and memory of an earlier
era, when jurists and judges managed to develop law that could
check and delegitimize authority, but within the clear norms and
bounds of Islamic faith.117
The above means that the theory and practice of legalism in
contemporary Arab politics has a fragmented quality. On the one
hand, Islamist political ideology grew throughout the Middle East
in the 1980s and 1990s to become the dominant current trope of
political discourse and opposition.118 As a result, Islam and shari’a
remain at the rhetorical and actual center of discussions of law in
contemporary Arab states. In particular, many Arab constitutions
clearly endorse Islamic law as the primary source for legislation.119
The most frequent rallying cry or demand of opponents to current
Arab governments is the amplification or restoration of shari’a
law.120
The extent to which Islam and shari’a should inform the rule of
law, and what forms this should take, is currently an area of great
debate and discussion among Arab and non-Arab Muslim schol
ars.121 Adding to the complexity of this issue is the theoretical con
tradiction between the Islamic ideal of siyyasa al-shari’a (the
government of God’s law) and dawlat or siyadat al-qanun (the sov
ereignty of man-made law).122 The latter term, rather than a native
Arab Islamic concept, is a direct Arabic translation of the Western

115.
116.
117.
118.

See id. at 143-94 (discussing the political roles for Arab constitutions).
MALLAT, supra note 101, at 167-71, 410-16.
See, e.g., HALLAQ, supra note 87, at 543-50.
M.A. Mohamed Salih & Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, Introduction, in INTER
PRETING ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTIES 1, 8-12 (M.A. Mohamed Salih ed., 2009).
119. Even a country with as developed secular legal and social traditions as Egypt
makes Islam its basic source for legislation in article 2 of its constitution. See CONSTI
TUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Sept. 11, 1971 (amended 2007).
120. E.g., FELDMAN, supra note 71, at 105.
121. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTI
ATING THE FUTURE OF SHARI’A 267-89 (2008).
122. 2 F. ROSENTHAL, THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 177-78 (E. J. Brill, 2006).
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idea of the rule of law, which may therefore convey a patina of
inauthenticity to at least some Arab Muslims.123
Like other broad ideological frames, Islam allows for diverse
interpretation about law and politics, and is compatible with the
actual contemporary Arab practice of mixed legal norms and insti
tutions. For this reason, a broad majority of government and oppo
sition fealty to shari’a exists alongside more secular courts,
bureaucrats and lawyers’ associations in many countries, with the
forces combined for analytical purposes as the “the legal complex”
in a recent study of law and democratization.124
Yet the standing of members of the Arab legal complex is the
second side of the contemporary rule of law’s fragmented nature.
Lawyers are sometimes part of an active and growing transnational
movement of Arabs, linked to global rights Non-Governmental Or
ganizations (NGO’s) and rule-of-law advocates, and are open to
more direct import of Western ideas or experiences with legalist
reform.125 Reflected in international fora and documents such the
Arab Human Development Reports, this posture does not reject the
importance of Islamic identity or law per se.126 Rather, it is a pref
erence, or at least a willingness, to articulate theories of legal and
political reform in terms translated directly from global usage such
as dimaqatriyya (democracy), huquq-el-insan (human rights), and
siyadat al-qanun (rule of law).127 This tendency can be grounded in
skepticism about the possibility of traditional Islamic terms to adapt
to modern political debates, a desire to avoid overburdening relig
ious concepts with excess contemporary meaning, or both.128
123. Mednicoff, supra note 113, at 17 & n.20 (“One of the signs of both legal
pluralism and the relative novelty of the Western notion of the rule of law in Arab
countries is that there is no single phrase that is used in every country to translate the
term. For example, in Morocco, the concept is often referred to as dawla el-haq w’al
qa’nun (the rule of right and law), instead of siyadat al-qa’nun. This term gained cur
rency through the Moroccan monarchy’s efforts to employ it as a slogan for its own
purported fealty to the ideal of the rule of law.”).
124. See MALCOLM FEELEY, FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE
STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 198-200, 481-84 (Ter
ence C. Halliday et al. eds., 2007).
125. See KEVIN DWYER, ARAB VOICES: THE HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 7-14 (1991).
126. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 63.
127. Fuad S. Naeem. A Traditional Islamic Response to the Rise of Modernity, in
ISLAM, FUNDAMENTALISM, AND THE BETRAYAL OF TRADITION 89 (Joseph E.B. Lum
bard ed., 2009).
128. Id.
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However, this indigenous Arab reformist tendency within por
tions of the legal complex is less likely to find broad sociopolitical
support, unlike Islamist political expression. In diverse Arab coun
tries such as Egypt, Morocco, Qatar, and Tunisia, lawyers, law stu
dents, and lay citizens speak articulately about the rule of law and
respect its limited success and broader promise to improve rights,
fairness and political transparency.129 At the same time, there is
tremendous cynicism about American foreign politics and aid gen
erally, and lack of confidence in domestic legal and political institu
tions.130 A century of popular historical associations of Western
legal and political ideals with colonial and post-colonial highly cen
tralized governments suggest a broad sense of mistrust with respect
to the concrete prospects of rule-of-law reform.
This matters for the regulation and securitization of migrant
workers in the particular Arab contexts of the oil-rich Gulf states
because it complicates and sometimes polemicizes the interplay of
local reform prospects and international human rights pressures.
First, and most obviously, the ease in which campaigns by Western
human rights and legal reform advocates can be portrayed as Trojan
horses for neo-imperialism reduces their influence, while increasing
at the same time the difficulties Gulf governments might face in
terms of nationalist legitimacy if they appear to bow to external
pressures.131
Second, and more subtly, the possible local perceptions of
Western rights advocates as inauthentic, hypocritical, or something
worse means that the politics around legal reform for guest workers
can often have an unvoiced subtext of sensitivity to Western power
influence.132 This is not easy for outside lawyers to appreciate fully,
but it makes international dialogue around rights and law often
129. This is on the basis of preliminary qualitative surveys that I have adminis
tered to lawyers and law students in Morocco and Qatar, as well as several longer inter
views. However, I am still collecting this data and am careful at this stage to limit
general and specific conclusions until data collection is further along.
130. See, e.g., Reports: Arabs Open to Democratic Reforms Despite Setbacks,
INT’L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL SYS. (May 15, 2007), http://www.ifes.org/Content/
Publications/Feature-Stories/2007/May/Reports-Arabs-Open-to-Democratic-Reforms
despite-setbacks.aspx (providing summary information and data files available at the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems’ project on the rule of law in Arab
countries).
131. See Farid Esack, The Contemporary Democracy and the Human Rights Pro
ject for Muslim Societies, in CONTEMPORARY ISLAM: DYNAMIC, NOT STATIC 117, 117-27
(Abdul Aziz Said et al. eds., 2006).
132. For a relatively public example of this in the press of Dubai, see Rashid
Saleh Al Oraimy, There’s Something Fishy about the Labour Protests, GULF NEWS
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about different things for Western and Gulf actors. Moreover, it
adds a strong additional impetus for workers’ status to be seen as a
security issue. If questions regarding law generally in Arab socie
ties are steeped in rhetoric around fears of Western control and as
pirations around shari’a’s relevance, this is even more salient when
the issue to which law is applied is the nature of non-citizen rights
in relatively young, dynamic states with overwhelming migrant
demographic majorities.
All of the above was in evidence at the Qatar Law Forum. Lo
cal Gulf legal scholars and officials dominated several sessions fo
cused on the relevance of Islam and Islamic law, along with its
ability to encompass and embrace local needs and international
rights.133 Westerners at other sessions spoke of overcoming deficits
in Arab law, especially in matters such as women’s rights and politi
cal freedoms. This may have left a whiff of neo-imerialism with
some Arab attendees, based on comments in Arabic which I over
heard after these sessions.
Disagreements about the appropriate role of religion in law
and the status and rights of migrants, remained mostly unvoiced
and generally unacknowledged. Yet these disagreements turn on
important embedded philosophical predispositions in Islamic and
Western individualist thought in terms of the nature of equality that
can suggest distinct postures on national identity and security. This
embedded tension around equality helps inform differing outcomes
with the regulation of migrant workers in cases like Qatar and the
United States.
III. EQUALITY, NATIONALISM, AND SECURITY
ARAB GULF SOCIETY

IN AN

EXEMPLAR

In comparative terms, Islam as world religion is often charac
terized by its broad concern for equality and social justice more
generally. One obvious piece of evidence for this concern is the
requirement of institutionalized charity, zakat, as one of the basic

(Apr. 26, 2006), http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/there-s-something-fishy
about-the-labour-protests-1.234295.
133. For instance, an entire session at the Qatar Law Forum was dedicated to
“Shari’ah and Legal Reform in the Arab World.” It was chaired by the Attorney-Gen
eral of Qatar HE Dr. Al bin Fetais Al-Marri and included an international panel of
Islamic scholars. See Program, supra note 24.
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five elements of faith known as the five pillars of Islam.134 Islam’s
historic aversion to interest-accruing banking is one of varied other
ways in which a concern for economic equity is perhaps more firmly
ensconced in traditional ideology than is true for core Western ide
ological articulations of equality.135
At the same time, as a faith-based community that arose in a
seventh century Arabian environment of existing multiple estab
lished religions, Islam had to find methods to coexist with other
creeds while maintaining its internal identity and dynamism.136
There could be no doctrine in the emerging religion that all people
were equal regardless of religion, and such a doctrine was out of
place in the seventh century in any case.137 Yet, Islam had two im
portant institutional innovations for regulating the status of nonMuslims that helped explain the social system’s success in sus
taining an array of civilizational and creative diversity in the Medi
terranean region during Europe’s Dark Ages.138 First is the idea of
the dhimmi, or permanent guest, a category initially, but not exclu
sively found in later Islamic history, applied to Christians and Jews
because of the importance each of their religions held as a prede
cessor religion to Islam.139 In exchange for payment of a tax, mem
bers of dhimmi religious groups lived indefinitely under Muslim
rule, and enjoyed autonomy of worship and a wide array of
rights.140 At the same time, it was clear that the dhimmi was a
member of a minority group with explicitly less connection to the
majority society for not being Muslim.141
134. See, e.g., 11 A. ZYSOW. ZAKAt, The Encyclopaedia of Islam 406-22 (E. J.
Brill ed., 2006); KHALED ABOU FADL, THE GREAT THEFT: WRESTLING ISLAM FROM
THE EXTREMISTS 120 (2005).
135. ABDULLAH SAEED, ISLAMIC BANKING AND INTEREST 1 (2d ed. 1999).
136. See BLACK, supra note 70, at 10-11 (providing a description of the early days
of Islam and the demographic landscape, especially in relation to non-Muslims and trib
alism within the region).
137. BAT YE’OR, THE DECLINE OF EASTERN CHRISTIANITY UNDER ISLAM: FROM
JIHAD TO DHIMMITUDE 144-47 (Miriam Kochan & David Littman trans., Fairleigh
Dickinson Univ. Press 1996).
138. Patrice C. Brodeur. Christianity and Islam, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM AND
THE MUSLIM WORLD 142, 142-48 (Richard C. Martin ed., 2003).
139. See BLACK, supra note 70, at 208-09 (discussing the usefulness of the dhimmi
rules in the Ottoman empire).
140. For a brief discussion of this principle that tries to frame issues of Islamic
communal history in language more familiar to a contemporary legal audience, see
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION 88-89 (1990).
141. Cl. Cahen, Dhimma, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 227, 227-31 (B.
Lewis, Ch. Pellat, & J. Schacht eds., 1991).
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A second more limited mechanism for allowing official status
to non-Muslims within explicitly Islamic societies was that of the
aman. This term refers to a contract under which any non-Muslim,
even one not respected for his religious roots with Islam like Chris
tians and Jews as ahl el-kitab, can have security in his person and
goods within an Islamic society for a limited period, often less than
a year.142 If the aman mechanism could apply to anyone outside of
the community of believers, it did not encompass the general rights,
acceptance or protection of dhimmi status, nor any likelihood of
more permanent residence. However, individual Muslims, as well
as leaders, had the capacity to grant aman.143
These two historic Islamic institutions are relevant for two re
lated reasons. First, they generally responded to a perceived need,
and set a precedent, for regulating communal rights in a way that
explicitly privileged Muslims while allowing for offsetting benefits
for non-Muslims. In short, dhimmi status in particular, by eschew
ing the idea that subcommunities necessarily had to find most of
their identity in the general society, could take some of the sting out
of a clear mandate of non-Muslims as separate and unequal.144 Sec
ond, the two traditional forms of status provided traditional tem
plates that held more than a little relevance for transposition to the
regulation of migrant workers in the contemporary era. Indeed,
there is a rough analogy that could be made between dhimmis and
skilled, Westernized professional workers, on the one hand, and
aman and non-skilled workers from less-developed societies, on the
other hand, in contemporary oil-rich Arab states like Qatar.
A clarification is in order here. This Article is not suggesting
that contemporary Gulf governments make direct use of classical
Islamic categories for thinking about non-native rights in general or
worker regulation in particular. Nor is it my argument that Islamic
political history and terminology permeate in a deterministic or
monolithic manner the thought process or legal climate of contem
porary Arab officials. Rather, the traditional Islamic acceptance of
categories of community residence that are less than full communal
membership is a rough model and touchstone of legitimacy for a
modern society in which distinct treatments for different classes of
142. J. Schacht, Amān, in 1 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM NEW EDITION 429,
429-30 (H.A.R. Gibb, et al. eds., 1986). Ahl el-kitab translates to “people of the book.”
G. Vajda, Ahl el-kitab, in 1 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM NEW EDITION 264, 264
(H.A.R. Gibb, et al. eds., 1986).
143. AN-NA’IM, supra note 140, at 88; HALLAQ, supra note 117, at 332-33.
144. Schacht, supra note 142, at 429-30.
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residents can be accepted, albeit mitigated with broader norms re
quiring equity, justice, and mercy.
Moreover, the contemporary context for regulating citizens
and non-citizens in Qatar is different in many ways from classical
Islamic history.145 Islam is a more contested, less realized basis for
social order after its marginalization as the sole actual basis for law
and politics in post-Ottoman, post-imperial independent Qatari na
tionhood.146 In addition, the diverse globalized influences from
Asia, Europe, and North America that permeate the small Arab
nation as a result of its extraordinary wealth and rapid pattern of
growth dismiss the idea that any particular model will have exclu
sive influence on the country’s pattern of regulation, or even unim
peded autonomy to regulate non-natives.
Nonetheless, the point here is that historical Islamic norms
around equality, which do not conform to Western standards of
simple legislated civil and political rights for all residents, happen to
resemble the basic norms by which contemporary wealthy, expan
sive Arab societies like Qatar distinguish between nationals and
non-nationals. This is part of a broader pattern of congruence with
Islamic historical norms of governance that have tended towards
dynastic family systems, which are ratified and maintained through
mechanisms of consensus and consultation of leading elite stake
holders.147 These mechanisms, with titles like shura (consultation)
and ritualized meeting points (majlis), do not correspond to formal
procedures for electoral democracy, but they share with the latter
an emphasis on political representation.148
Thus, Qatar makes use of political and regulatory reference
points loosely derived from Islamic models that are more communi
tarian and egalitarian, but less pluralist and rights-oriented, than
Anglo-American foundational political norms. While I do not wish
to essentialize or over-characterize such a contrast, I do suggest dis
tinct points of departure for the United States and Qatar with re
145. There are several major differences that separate Qatar’s contemporary con
text towards migration from other Arab nations, including their great relative wealth,
general rejection of the concept of foreigners naturalizing, and that they were “never
officially a colony of any European power” (although they were a “protected state”
under the British rule). Nagy, supra note 32, at 121.
146. For a description of the legal system in Qatar see THE RULE OF LAW, supra
note 27, at 179-85.
147. For a more recent historical example of the prevalence of dynastic rule in the
Middle East, see ROGAN, supra note 110, at 479-81.
148. A. Ayalon, Shura, in 9 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM NEW EDITION 504,
504-06 (C.E. Bosworth, et al. eds., 1997).
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spect to how to deal with non-citizen residents. Within an
American political framework, expectations of formal equivalence
of rights and a national identity founded in historical ideological
affiliation mean that full citizenship privileges are assumed to be a
possibility and an end goal for residents.149 This assumption colors
both immigration policy debates and the imagination of migrants
themselves.
By contrast, in Qatar, there is no long-standing political tradi
tion to presuppose that undifferentiated legislated citizenship for all
is the likely or assumed outcome for those outside of the dominant,
national community. If norms around social and economic fairness
exist, then distinct sub-communal arrangements—recalling dhimmi
status, or even more limited and temporary accommodations, recal
ling aman—are reasonable ways to bring non-nationals into the so
ciety, without the possibility of full membership or integration.
With this in mind, there is a logic to the function of the Qatari
expatriate labor market, where employment offers tend to outbid
the going rate for a worker based on the wages for similar positions
in her own native country.150 Thus, engineers engaged in similar
work in Doha who come from India and the United States make
vastly different salaries, because of an assumption that differentia
tion by communal norms is appropriate, so long as that differentia
tion is accepted generally by the parties themselves.151 Clear
inequality across diverse populations residing within the same coun
try is acceptable where there is no expectation that those popula
tions should integrate or achieve uniform standards of national
membership.
Of course, the realities of contemporary Qatar make this lack
of a historical predisposition towards pluralist integration through
citizenship more compelling and conscious. Qatar’s combined
small native population and tremendous wealth have made
breakneck expansion through relatively well-paid global labor quite
likely. At the same time, the social welfare benefits that this wealth
allows the Qatari government to provide its citizens would make
full citizenship economically quite desirable for migrants, which
149. This is evident in the U.S. Council on Foreign Affair’s emphasis on the im
portance of immigration to American history and of upholding American values of fair
ness under the law. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY:
INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT NO. 63 106-08 (2009), available at http://www.cfr.
org/publication/20030/us_immigration_policy.html.
150. Nagy, supra note 32, at 123.
151. Id.
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certainly helps explain why the government, like its peers in the
Gulf region, allows for no such citizenship prospects for expatriate
workers.152 Because of this, an additional resonance from Islamic
theory that might seem logical is also not applied, namely, the pos
sibility that all Muslims would be fully-integrated members of the
Qatari nation, irrespective of their geographical origins. While
non-Qatari Muslims worship alongside Qataris in mosques and find
dominant social practices largely consonant with their own religious
backgrounds, they are still generally unable to attain full member
ship in the country in which they live.153
Along with the importance of Islamic legal traditions and the
legitimacy of a notion of inter-communal equity that does not as
sume equal civil rights and the possibility of citizenship for all,
Qatari legal policy towards migrants is shaped by the politics of na
tional identity and security. These latter points are inter-linked in
Qatar in several ways. First, the relative youth of the Qatari nation,
with formal independence dating only to 1971, means that national
identity is rather loose and undergoing formation.154 With no real
long-standing historical registers of nationhood, Qatar resorts to
genealogy and traditional dress as markers of shared identity.155
Second, a traditional distinction that allows for securitization of mi
grants is Islam’s broad divide between societies of Muslims and of
non-believers, with the latter at times referred to dar-al harb (“the
152. COUNTRY REPORT: QATAR, FREEDOM HOUSE (2010), http://www.freedom
house.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2010&country=7902.
153. This lack of full communal equality for non-Qatari Muslims is an embedded
tension within the society. Qataris often will complain about whether many of the nonQatari Muslims of Southeast Asian and other origins are true Muslims, an occurrence
that suggests an understanding that true Muslims should experience broad social equal
ity. Qatari men are allowed to marry non-Qatari Muslim women, although the reverse
is generally not true. Need to Ensure Equal Citizenship Rights to Women, THE PENIN
SULA (May 5, 2010), http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/q/56-tofol-jassim-al-nasr/2049
need-to-ensure-equal-citizenship-rights-to-women.html. The official rules regarding cit
izenship specify continued residence for twenty-five years as a necessary, but not suffi
cient, precondition. Barbara Bibbo, Expats Can Apply for Qatari Citizenship, GULF
NEWS (June 6, 2006), http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/qatar/expats-can-apply-for-qatari
citizenship-1.239793. Despite all of this, Qatar’s ruler can and does grant citizenship,
most often to prominent Muslims, again reflecting the historical norm towards conceiv
ing of community based on religious affiliation. An example of this was the grant of
Qatari citizenship to a wealthy Muslim Indian painter. See, e.g., India’s Exiled ‘Picasso’
Takes Qatari Citizenship, FRANCE 24 (Feb. 27, 2010), http://www.france24.com/en/
20100227-indias-exiled-picasso-takes-qatari-citizenship.
154. ROSEMARIE SAID ZAHLAN, THE CREATION OF QATAR 112 (1979).
155. See Nagy, supra note 32, at 127-31. In fact, within the Qatari people, there
are many variations of identity reflected by variations of dress, family names, and other
cues outsiders would view as subtle. See id.
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house of war”).156 Again, I want to be clear that I am not sug
gesting a tendency for Qatari Muslims, who are extremely global
ized in their influences and lifestyles, to think of outsiders as
enemies; this is categorically not the case. Rather, the existence of
one particular distinction within Islamic history can act as a very
minor push to help people already inclined to do so in some situa
tions to consider the issue of regulating non-natives in security
terms.
A more material reason that Qatari policies towards non-na
tionals are readily securitized is the general geographical and demo
graphic context of the small country. Qatar is located between two
regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and close to states with
recent histories of internal violence, Iraq and Yemen.157 The com
bination of the very real concern posed by Qatar’s neighborhood
and its history of being under the protection of a great power for
the past century has meant that the country is nearly entirely de
pendent militarily on the United States.158 In other words, in
Qatar, the traditional core concern of national security policy, terri
torial integrity and protection, is essentially contracted out to an
other country, which pushes other issues like non-national residents
into the forefront of security considerations.
This is especially the case given the country’s small native pop
ulation and swelling ranks of non-national residents. Because of
their society’s immense recent wealth, and the ambitions for pre
eminence in culture, media, and sports that this has fed, Qataris are
a minority of around 10% within their own country.159 The diverse
multinational consumer culture that has emerged in Qatar, and
elsewhere in small Arab oil states, has turned the world’s closest
current lingua franca, English, into the dominant influence in a
highly Arabized land.160 Thus, despite their wealth and privilege, it
156. A. Abel, Dar al-harb, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM NEW EDITION
126, 126 (B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat & J. Schacht eds., 1991).
157. An article in the Qatari newspaper The Peninsula indicates that Qatari peo
ple recognize their location in the world as an opportunity to be a moderator between
the West and their less peaceful neighbors. See Qatar Can Serve as a Bridge Between
East and West, THE PENINSULA (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/
qatar-perspective/1072-qatar-can-serve-as-a-bridge-between-east-and-west.html.
158. Sunday Morning: Qatar in Transition, supra note 55.
159. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 43 (“Foreign workers comprise as much as
85% of the total population and make up about 90% of the total labor force.”).
160. See CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: FIELD LIST
ING–LANGUAGES, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/
print_2098.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2011) (listing, for example, Qatar as having English
as a common second language and Kuwait as having English widely spoken).
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is easy for Qataris to feel ethnically, linguistically, and especially,
culturally overwhelmed in their own society. This, in turn, makes it
natural for policy towards migrants to become securitized. Indeed,
the status of migrants easily becomes the top local issue of national
security when military and territorial integrity are largely outside of
the realm of government action.
The two main migrant populations present different possible
visions of insecurity to the small native population, reinforcing a
possible perceived native need to securitize their status.161 The
comparatively small Western mainly professional group is most
likely to challenge usually indirectly, established local social prac
tices, whether this is around questions of language, dress, romance,
or religious pluralistic equality.162 On the other hand, the large
populations of often exploited less-skilled construction and domes
tic workers from South and Southeast Asia raise concerns for na
tives about strikes, criminal activity, and other issues that could
disrupt the normal flow of Qatari society.163 Taken together, rea
sonable or not, fears of Western workers’ pressure on traditional
social practices and Eastern workers’ shut-down of daily life com
bine to buttress the likelihood that regulating the large non-na
tional majority is viewed as a core question of national security.
If the non-national vast majority of residents in small Arab oilrich countries like Qatar are easily seen as a potential security
threat, they are also indispensible. Policies aimed at nativizing sig
nificant segments of the workforce have run afoul of a combination
of lack of incentives or adequate training for some natives and the
sheer pace and ambition of social and economic growth.164 Con
temporary wealthy Gulf city-states like Abu Dhabi, Doha, and
Dubai compete informally for tangible accomplishments on the
global stage, such as Abu Dhabi’s world-class museums, Doha’s
media and university cities and Dubai’s extravagant building
161. Efforts to break perceived security threats from migration into discrete cate
gories go back to Myron Weiner’s edited volume, see INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND
SECURITY 10-18 (Myron Weiner ed., 1993).
162. For an example, see the blog posts of a British national blogging under the
pseudonym, Jane01, on the Qatar Living online website. See, e.g., Jane01, QATAR LIV
ING (Mar. 31, 2008 6:31 AM), http://www.qatarliving.com/blog/jane01.
163. Andrew Gardner, Labor Camps in the Gulf States, Viewpoints: Migration
and the Gulf, THE MIDDLE EAST INSTIT. 57, http://ups.academia.edu/AndrewGardner/
Papers/328943/Labor_Camps_in_the_Gulf_States. For general Middle Eastern history
of labor strikes by migrant workers, see OWEN, supra note 6, at 204-07.
164. See, e.g., Tofol Jassim Al-Nasr, Patriotism vs Privilege, THE PENINSULA (May
2, 2010 8:52 PM), http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/q/56-tofol-jassim-al-nasr/1693
tofol-jassim-al-nasr.html; see also, Berrebi et al., supra note 42, at 432.
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projects. However, it is hard to imagine this extraordinarily rapid
growth continuing other than on a foundation of copious workers
that the native population cannot possibly supply.
Thus, a government like Qatar’s cannot restrict the influx of
migrants without choking its grand ambitions for rapid develop
ment. Securitizing the inflow of migrants then becomes a question
of information and internal management, rather than of reducing
overall numbers. In short, in its lack of interest or ability to think of
restricting legal migrants as the primary component of immigration
policy and in its lack of predisposition to assume that migrants are
likely to be able to integrate into national society in the long-run,
Qatar’s government is quite different from its analogues in the
United States and West more generally, despite at least as much
overall tendency to securitize the issue area.
Thus, from the perspective of migrants, the dark side of securi
tizing immigration policy diverges a great deal in Qatar and the
United States. In Qatar, there is little illegal immigration, facili
tated both by the country’s desert and ocean land borders, and by
its large numbers of legal migrant workers. Thus, the major chal
lenges for officials in Doha would seem to be keeping close tabs on,
and discouraging the potential for social destabilization of, the le
gions of non-citizens in the country. The process for regularizing
non-nationals’ residence documents is rather elaborate, and in
cludes health scans and biometrics.165 New migrant workers clearly
pick up the message that they are not only the intense subjects of a
national security apparatus, but they are also, in addition, depen
dent on the help and agency of their employers, who actually rec
ommend and maintain their resident visas.166
165. Official Allays Fear of Mandatory Health Tests, THE PENINSULA, July 4,
2010, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/qatar/55804-official-allays-fears-of-mandatory
health-tests.html.
166. Qatar’s recent 2009 reform of its labor law prohibits employers from holding
the passports of their employees. Labour Law and Changes in Sponsorship Rules, THE
PENINSULA, Feb. 24, 2011, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/law/143688-labour-law
and-changes-in-sponsorship-rules.html. However, as is true in many Gulf Arab socie
ties, this practice continues, and employers handle the official status of their non-native
employees in any case, because of the nature of the kefala, sponsorship system, under
which all foreigners remain in the country based on their contracts with their employ
ers, rather than the leave of the state itself. Nagy, supra note 32, at 122. A recent
investigative report from Verité shows that the problems related to the sponsorship
system are still very real, despite recent reforms. Help Wanted: Hiring, Human Traffick
ing and Modern-Day Slavery in the Global Economy, VERITÉ RES. AND ADVOC. INITIA
TIVE 58, June 2010, http://www.verite.org/helpwanted/.
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In addition, the acceptance of inequality across national and
racial grounds means that lower-status migrant workers suffer
longer lines, and possibly more degrading treatment, at the hands of
the Qatari state than do higher-status Westerners, often in the same
facility.167 In a context of great wealth and pressures to regulate the
myriads of foreign residents of diverse backgrounds and often low
status, individual workers’ concerns for privacy and other civil
rights take a back seat to the potential security threat that they are
presumed to represent. If Qatari state surveillance is not nearly so
extensive than that in many non-elected political systems, there is
nonetheless a sufficiently copious amount of biometric and other
private data on millions of foreigners to arouse concern.168 Indeed,
in other wealthy Arab contexts, officials have voiced pride in their
ability to gather, and if necessary, to deploy a tremendous amount
of personal data on foreign workers resident in their territory.169
It is increasingly the case that the United States, and other
countries, are following the practice of small states like Qatar in
gathering growing amounts of biometric and other sensitive data on
non-citizen legal residents.170 Nonetheless, the major focus of U.S.
immigration policy, in national security terms, is in limiting legal
immigration and attempting, however unsuccessfully, to halt illegal
non-citizen entry into the country.171 In other words, the major
thrust of American policy to control non-citizens is that of barring
entry by law and by force, and imprisoning and expelling aliens
167. A personal example of this was the comparative treatment of me and my
wife during the biometric procedures to obtain our residence permits in 2006. In part
due to the relatively conservative social norms of the country, women and men are
separated during these procedures. My wife, who is half-Indian, was assumed to be a
worker from India, and was made to wait in a much longer line for fingerprinting, while
I was ushered into an air-conditioned VIP room because of my presumed Western
origin.
168. Chris V. Panganiban, Filipinos in Qatar Join Saudi Protest Against E-Pass
ports, THE PENINSULA, July 10, 2010, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/qatar/119741
filipinos-in-qatar-join-saudi-protest-against-e-passports.html.
169. See, e.g., Marten Youssef & Kareem Shaheen, UAE is Urged to Find a Bal
ance, THE NAT’L (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/health/uae
is-urged-to-find-a-balance (quoting Dr. Ahmed al Marzooqi, United Arab Emirates’
Director of the DNA Database Department, regarding plans to implement UAE’s na
tional DNA database).
170. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SAFETY & SECURITY OF U.S. BORDERS: BIOMET
RICS, http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/info/info_1336.html (last visited Jan. 23,
2011) (providing an official government statement on what is collected and why).
171. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 149, at 6-7; see also Developing a Strong Border and Immigration Policy, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2010),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/08/Developing-a-Strong-Border-and
Immigration-Policy.
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when this fails. In Qatar and similar societies, by contrast, the pol
icy is somewhat less coercive and restrictive, in that it is geared to
wards controlling, and providing a base level of socioeconomic
benefits for, legal aliens who enter in much higher proportions vis
à-vis the citizen population.172
For non-citizen residents of Qatar, this difference in the nature
of state policy leads to distinct expectations. They know from the
beginning of their time in the tiny country that their value is timebound, and dependent on work, and their stake in the society is
correspondingly limited. At the same time, since there is no expec
tation of citizenship, and this is true across the board for migrants,
legal status and national identity, for better or worse, are
transparent.
This contrasts with the shifts in possible national status and
identity, and the burdensome calculations they foster, for many
non-citizens in the United States. What Saskia Sassen depicts as
the diffuse categories of nationality and legality that are illuminated
by contemporary immigration173 is a phenomenon in countries like
the United States. Here, for example, the diverse, unpredictable
determinants of immigration policy and the real possibility of full
citizenship can make entering and remaining in the country ille
gally, under some circumstances, a more likely route to eventual
citizenship than working within the legal visa system.174 On the
other hand, the growing securitization of immigration policy has in
creased the risks for, and backlash against, illegal non-citizen re
sidents, so that the chance of incarceration and deportation is
great.175 Thus, the promise, with frequently shifting ground, of
equal citizenship can encourage migrants to undertake a pattern of
calculated unregulated work, other routine legal transgression, con
cealment, and risk that are, at best, disruptive, and, at worst, unpre
dictably uprooting and coercive.
172. Nagy, supra note 32, at 122.
173. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS 261-63 (2006).
174. Paral, supra note 16, at 6.
175. See MASSEY & SANCHEZ, supra note 3, at 77-78. The following illustrates
the increase in immigration enforcement in the United States after the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001:
Whereas in 1986 only 25,000 immigrants were arrested and deported from the
United States, by 1996 the figure had climbed to 160,000 . . . deportations
surged to reach a record 359,000 in 2008; this level has never been seen before
in U.S. history and outdoes the mass deportation campaigns of the 1930s by a
factor of three.
Id. at 77-78.
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From the regulating state’s perspective, implementing the
securitization of migrant workers by limiting inflows rather than
maximizing legal contractors is both expensive and imperfect. De
spite the millions of dollars that U.S. Homeland Security and other
law enforcement agencies spend yearly on border control, it is
widely acknowledged that trying to make American borders en
tirely closed to illegal aliens is impossible.176 The costs of imprison
ing and deporting illegal migrants are an additional severe burden,
and one that might be avoidable if more modest spending was di
rected instead to subsidizing or regularizing migrant jobs to elimi
nate some of the incentives for employers to hire illegally off of the
books.177
Of course, many conditions differ between countries like Qatar
and the United States that could preclude shifting U.S. practices to
reflect the basic thrust of Qatari problems. Unemployment, rather
than a surplus of possible jobs, is of much greater concern in the
United States, and may help account for the strong popular antiimmigrant pressures that have contributed to the general upswing
in the securitization of migration policy. In Qatar, the combination
of less populist democratic practices of the political system and a
continuing rapidly expanding economy, that leaves little real alter
native to massive numbers of foreign workers, means that cutting
back on legal contract workers is unlikely.178
Nonetheless, part of the implication of this argument is that
securitizing migration policy itself is in part the cause of anti-immi
grant sentiment. For one thing, decades of United States restric
tions on legal foreign workers have helped establish the high levels
of illegal immigration.179 This, over time, helped sustain the under
ground low-wage illegal alien employment market, encouraged neg
ative popular American images of migrants as law-breakers or
176. See, e.g., C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., BRICK BY BRICK: A HALF-DECADE OF
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION RE
FORM 10, 12-14 (2010), available at http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/documents/doc/
062810_cap_dhs_enforcement.
177. See, e.g., Jack Martin & Eric A. Ruark, The Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigra
tion on United States Taxpayers 21-22 (2010), available at http://www.fairus.org/site/
DocServer/USCostStudy_2010.pdf?docID=4921. For more general discussion of the se
vere problems that illegal aliens face if captured, see generally Karen Tumlin et al., A
Broken System, NAT’L IMMIGR. LAW CENTER (July 28, 2009), http://www.nilc.org/imm
lawpolicy/arrestdet/A-Broken-System-2009-07.pdf.
178. Berrebi et al., supra note 42, at 430-42.
179. See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey, Borderline Madness: America’s Counterproduc
tive Immigration Policy, in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 129, 129-38 (Carol M. Swain, ed.,
2007).
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threats to national culture,180 and fostered an impulse towards more
coercive and incarceratory policies. The promise of citizenship and
sociopolitical rights that this entails, along with the reality of an in
creasingly closed and punitive set of national policies and a labor
market nonetheless dependent on low-wage, low-status labor,
makes for a destructive quality of life for alien workers in the
United States that is, in practice, not easy to see as superior to the
clearly more overtly discriminatory practices of states like Qatar.
IV. COMPARING SECURITIZED MIGRATION POLICY
AND THE UNITED STATES

IN

QATAR

I am not arguing that eliminating the possibility of citizenship
for non-national workers in the United States is just or desirable.
The theory behind the United States as an open society for people
of diverse origins remains in itself a major magnet for migrants, and
it is one that should enhance the lives of both natives and the small
group of migrants who see the theory’s realization. In Qatar, the
lack of full equality norms along national and ethnic grounds is
hardly a global model, and leads to many instances of pernicious
worker mistreatment which deserve to receive the level of human
rights focus that is increasingly a focus of Western NGO’s and gov
ernments.181 Moreover, countries like Qatar are no less prone to
securitize migrant worker policy, and this securitization has en
couraged a level of biometric and other incursions into personal pri
vacy that are being implemented throughout the world and raise
frightening prospects for heightened surveillance and
incarceration.182
Rather, this Article has two major points. The first, broader
one is that the securitization of migration policy encourages a range
of coercive practices that have the dual effects of increasing state
coercive budgets and capacity, and of exacerbating tensions be
tween citizens and non-nationals in societies as diverse as Qatar and
the United States. It is not mere coincidence, but a partial function
180. See, e.g., Samuel Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, FOREIGN POL’Y,
MAR./APR. 2004 30, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/03/01/the_
hispanic_challenge.
181. See The Island of Happiness: Exploitation of Migrant Workers on Saadiyat
Island, Abu Dhabi, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 19, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/
2009/05/18/island-happiness-0.
182. For a discussion of the implementation international biometric identification,
see David Lyon, National IDs in a Global World: Surveillance, Security, and Citizenship,
42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 607, 607-08 (2010).
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of the facts and rhetoric of non-national securitization, that popular
native suspicion around foreigners takes the same forms of fear of
criminal activity and concern for national culture in Doha that it
does in Detroit. If non-nationals are, in practice, unlikely to be
come full members of society, it is natural for nationals to react to
this with a mix of distrustful attitudes.
This relative similarity in the effects of securitizing migrant
workers where legal and political norms diverge as much as they do
in the United States and Qatar suggests the second more subtle ma
jor point of the Article. That is, if actual results of securitizing mi
gration are comparable across countries with quite different ideals
around citizenship and equality, the usefulness of the norms them
selves requires a bit of unpacking. This is especially the case in the
context of the United States and Arab Gulf societies, where the
tendency of the former is to assume the legal backwardness and to
problematize the sociopolitical practices of the latter, as noted in
the discussion above of the Qatar Law Forum.183 Migrant workers’
rights problems are undoubtedly severe in Arab oil-rich societies,
and deserve the intense human rights scrutiny that they receive.
Despite this, some of the flow of rhetoric around rights issues from
the West may be suspect if the reality of foreign workers’ exper
iences in the West is comparably problematic in practice to what
happens in the Gulf.
The reality of migration in the United States is that the level of
securitization may have led to reductions in recent years in illegal
foreign workers, but that millions remain either incarcerated, in the
process of being deported, or living a clandestine existence with lit
tle current hope of regularization.184 The illusory promise of full
citizenship and the fears of national identity or economic competi
tion that feed into, and are replicated by, securitization, help frame
this severe problem. Yet many migrants may well view the prospect
of stable employment in the United States without attaining native
rights as acceptable, while the labor market still seems to include
positions that native Americans cannot or will not fill.185 This is, of
course, the situation in Qatar.
183. An Introduction, supra note 25.
184. See, e.g., William Finnegan, Borderlines, NEW YORKER, July 26, 2010, at 19,
19-20; Douglas Massey, Backfire at the Border: Why Enforcement without Legalization
Cannot Stop Illegal Immigration, CATO INST. TRADE POL’Y ANALYSIS, June 13, 2005, at
1.
185. For a discussion of conflict between countries’ labor needs and policy see
Cornelius & Tsuda, supra note 10, at 9-11.
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Thus, the high level of fixed-term contract legal workers in
Qatar suggests several possible lessons for countries like the United
States. First, an emphasis on a wider range of legal migrant catego
ries, or a large expansion of the numbers of legal, fixed-term mi
grant workers, might be a less expensive and more enforceable
general shift in migration policy worth considering in the United
States. The lack of assumed interconnection between work con
tracts and possible citizenship in places like Qatar, though unfair in
some ways, allows for a level of clarity for natives and non-natives
alike around the issue that at least permits a very large number of
worker visas relative to the population. Raising the number of
fixed-term legal workers as one strand of a disentangled immigra
tion policy is, in fact, a part of United States discussions of immigra
tion reform.186
A second possible lesson of the divergence in legal policy amid
heavy securitization of the issue of foreign workers in the United
States and the Arab Gulf is the tendency for securitization to com
plicate flexible management of the issue generally. In Arab con
texts, this can take several forms. Generally, securitizing the
question of migrant workers’ regulation fosters additional elements
of mistrust among natives and the diverse migrant subpopulation
groups, thereby likely producing, or facilitating, stepped-up inter
group conflict and state intrusion.187 The above is less a problem in
contemporary Qatar than in comparable city-states, such as Dubai
in the United Arab Emirates. There, the sheer extent and speed of
growth have been accompanied by heightened securitization, spin
ning into strategies of central control that retard the very open busi
ness environment that helps fuel the growth, such as the recent
decision to ban Blackberry smart phone data plans because their
autonomy from local state control allowed them to be termed a se

186. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 149, at 6-7, 84-88; see also
Angela Maria Kelley et al., Principles for Immigration Reform, CENTER AM. PROGRESS
(June 24, 2009), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/06/immigration_
principles.html; Demetrios G. Papademetriou et al., Aligning Temporary Immigration
Visas with US Labor Market Needs: The Case for a New System of Provisional Visas,
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (July 2009), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Provisional_
visas.pdf.
187. One clear statement of Qatari’s mistrust of non-native workers is in the im
plementation of “Family Day” at the shopping centers in Doha. See Out of Bounds,
THE PENINSULA (Oct. 1, 2008, 1:48 AM), http://archive.thepeninsulaqatar.com/
component/content/article/349-qatar-newsarchive/75420.html.
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curity threat.188 In Qatar, by contrast, over a decade of managed
central growth of relatively open media, like the regional cable sta
tions of Al-Jazira, and higher educational institutions, has created a
counter-weight of relative press and intellectual opaqueness to the
Orwellian and communal divisive tendencies of the securitized
state.189
In fact, the pathologies of securitizing legal migration policies
in the United States may be even more severe than in Qatar. Even
accounting for the understandable ongoing effects on American
culture and politics of the attacks by non-U.S. citizens of September
11, 2001, recent trends in securitizing migrants have included re
markable amplification, even duplication, of surveillance organiza
tions190 and anti-immigrant border amplification. The
securitization of the national debate around residents without legal
status has turned ugly, and possibly unconstitutional, in recent
months, with Arizona’s 2010 law that authorizes security workers to
stop and arrest suspected illegal immigrants.191
Different norms around citizenship and equality in the United
States, despite seeming fairer than the over-segmentation by na
tional origin of countries like Qatar, do not necessarily lead to
kinder outcomes for non-national workers. Indeed, the inability, or
security-driven populist democratic disinclination, for the U.S. gov
ernment to live up to its own official promises around citizenship
may feed into the broad problems of national migration policy, by
giving illegal migrants false hope for regularized status or unwitting
incentives to conceal their presence for fear of coercion by increas
ingly securitized federal and state governments.
188. See, e.g., Blackberry Ban in the Middle East (ABC television broadcast Aug.
2, 2010), available at http://abcnews.go.com/International/video/uae-bans-blackberrys
blackberry-messenger-hard-track-11308307.
189. See Delinda C. Hanley, Qatar’s Education City is Building Bridges to a Better
Future, 26 WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE E. AFF., Aug. 2007, at 30, 30-32; see also Wendy
Wallace, Qatar Invests in a Vision, THE MIDDLE EAST, July 2005, at 57, 57-59 (discuss
ing commitment to education in general).
190. See, e.g., Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: A Washing
ton Post Investigation, WASH. POST., July 19, 2010 - Dec. 20, 2010, http://projects.wash
ingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/ (providing a series of reports on U.S. intelligence
organizations and their relative secrecy and lack of political accountability).
191. See, e.g., Archibold, supra note 8, at A1; see also, James Doty, Arizona’s
New Immigration Law I Unconstitutional, SALON.COM (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.
salon.com/news/feature/2010/04/26/is_arizona_immigration_law_constitutional (discuss
ing the law’s likely constitutional problems); Ruthann Robson, Arizona Immigration
Law SB 1070, CONST. LAW PROF BLOG (Apr. 24, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.
com/conlaw/2010/04/arizona-immigration-law.html.
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This suggests a third and final lesson from the diverse forms of
securitized legal regulation of migrant workers in Qatar and the
United States. In an era of legal globalization, it is understandable
that lawyers and policymakers would assume that similar standards
and practices around migrants are sensible. To a large extent,
global equity and universalistic fairness dictate this outcome.
Nonetheless, if underlying social understandings of law and of
equality differ significantly, as I have argued is true with respect to
the secularization and security usage of law in the United States
and Qatar, then these deeper distinctions need to be at least taken
into account in fashioning legal outcomes.192
More specifically, reasonable predispositions, such as those in
the official rhetoric at the Qatar Law Forum, towards the view that
legal rights must take similar shape and reflect universal norms,
have to consider the countervailing social undercurrents, including
religious establishment and anti-immigration populism. I have ar
gued that some aspects of Islamic history and decoupling from cen
tral Arab state control can facilitate an understanding of nonnationals as separate in their rights from citizens in some ways.
However, this separation at least allows for large numbers of con
tractually-limited, fixed-term non-native workers in societies like
Doha, whereas broad popular pressures against non-citizen workers
in the United States have led to a very different set of problems for
these workers. In short, especially because of the securitization of
migration issues, the contemporary situation for guest workers can
be summed up as a pointed paraphrase of Tolstoy’s famous bookopening phrase. Namely, each state that securitizes the legal status
of non-national workers tends to make those workers unhappy in
their own way.193

192. See supra Part I.
193. LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky
trans., Penguin Classics 2003) (1878).

